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Abstract
We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, where the state of the world follows
an iid–process throughout the game. At each period, the sender observes the current state, and
sends a message to the receiver, suggesting either to stop or to continue. The receiver, only seeing
the message but not the state, decides either to stop the game, or to continue which takes the
game to the next period. The payoff to each player is a function of the state when the receiver
quits, with higher states leading to better payoffs. The horizon of the game can be finite or
infinite.
We prove existence and uniqueness of responsive (i.e. non-babbling) Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (PBE) under mild conditions on the game primitives in the case where the players are
sufficiently patient. The responsive PBE has a remarkably simple structure, which builds on the
identification of an easy-to-implement and compute class of threshold strategies for the sender.
With the help of these threshold strategies, we derive simple expressions describing this PBE. It
turns out that in this PBE the receiver obediently follows the recommendations of the sender.
Hence, surprisingly, the sender alone plays the decisive role, and regardless of the payoff function
of the receiver the sender always obtains the best possible payoff for himself.
JEL Classification: C73; D82; D83
Keywords: Sender-Receiver games, Stopping games, Bayesian games, Incentive Compatibility
1 Introduction
Information transmission is a fundamental element of economic models. In various settings, a better
informed party (sender) is in the position to transmit information to a lesser informed or even unin-
formed party (receiver). Typically, the action choices of the receiver have an influence on the payoff
of the sender, and hence the information transmission has a strategic aspect. In their seminal paper,
Crawford and Sobel [4], analyze strategic information transmission with a single interaction between
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the sender and the receiver. Their model and its variations [4, 10] have a wide range of applications,
notably in economics, computer science, political science but also in biology and philosophy [2, 19, 12].
Recently, a few models have been introduced in which the information transmission takes place in a
dynamic setting, see for instance [16] and [9]. In these models, the sender-receiver game is played
repeatedly either on a finite or an infinite horizon and the payoff for the sender and the receiver is the
total discounted sum of the stage payoffs. The key focus in these papers is the characterization of the
set of equilibrium payoffs where, in the spirit of the folk theorem, the players are sufficiently patient.
This paper sets the stage for a different line of research, which we regard as an important conceptual
contribution of our work. Specifically, this paper introduces a model of sender-receiver stopping games,
which combines features from dynamic sender-receiver games and stopping games (for a survey on the
latter, see [20]). In these games the strategic information transmission takes place repeatedly until
the receiver decides to stop the interaction. More precisely, we deal in this paper with sender-receiver
stopping games of finite as well as infinite horizon. In the finite horizon, the receiver is forced to stop
the game before a pre-defined terminal period has been reached. In the infinite horizon the game
may be played for unlimited number of periods. The timing of the game is as follows: In each period
nature draws a state of the world, which is only revealed to the sender. After observing the state of
the world, the sender sends one out of two messages to the receiver. This message is interpreted as
a suggestion either to stop the game or to continue. Now the receiver has to take a decision. After
seeing the message, but without knowing the state, the receiver has two options: he can decide to
stop the game, or he can decide to continue to the next period. The payoff to each player is a function
of the state at which the receiver stops, and these payoffs are either discounted or undiscounted. The
setting could be thought as an investor (the receiver) who must make an irreversible financial decision,
without having exact information about the market situation, but using the advice of an expert (the
sender).
We assume that rewards are positively correlated with the state of nature, i.e. higher states lead to
better payoffs for both players. Thus, both player have identical ordinal preferences over realizations
of the state of nature. Yet, as we impose no further restrictions on the payoffs, the cardinal assignment
of values of the two payoff functions can be very different. As a consequence, a certain state may be
very appealing to one player, but not so much to the other, creating an interesting strategic tension
between the parties. This paper investigates to what extent the cardinal differences may hamper
coordination between the players.
The main solution concept that we use to analyze these games is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE),
and we identify a class of PBEs which are appealing to the players in terms of payoffs, and moreover
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easy to compute and implement.
1.1 Our contribution
We are interested in PBEs in which the receiver plays a responsive strategy. We call a receiver’s
strategy responsive if his mixed stage game action is different for different messages sent by the sender.
This is just a condition which excludes those PBEs in which the receiver’s strategy is babbling, which
are fairly uninteresting from a strategic perspective. 1
Therefore, the crucial question is how the sender should use his additional information to manipulate
the choices of the receiver given the current state, and to what extent the receiver can trust the
sender’s recommendations and be obedient. In particular, we investigate under what conditions the
incentives of the sender and the receiver match.
These concerns are captured by the notion of a regular strategy profile. In a regular strategy profile,
the receiver simply follows the sender’s recommendations, whereas the sender sends a sincere message,
given the realization of the state, whether or not he would like the receiver to terminate the game at
this period. Since the receiver is obedient, he is not playing an active role in such a strategy profile.
The sender’s sincere strategy is a threshold strategy that sends the message “continue” if the current
state is below the threshold and sends the message “quit” otherwise. In other words, the sender’s
strategy is the optimal solution of the one player maximization problem in which the decision to
continue or to quit is delegated to the sender. This means that in the regular strategy profile the
sender obtains the best possible payoff for himself. Indeed, this outcome is Pareto optimal. The game
we study admits an (essentially) unique2 regular strategy profile.
In finite horizon, we show that there is no responsive PBE other than the regular strategy profile.
Even the regular strategy profile may fail to exist in certain games if the discount factor is small.
More precisely, our findings are as follows:
(i) The regular strategy profile is the unique responsive PBE if the discount factor is sufficiently
high or if the payoffs are undiscounted.
(ii) There are games that have no responsive PBE if the discount factor is small enough.
For the infinite horizon, we focus on strategy profiles where the expected payoffs after any period do
not depend on the history. We show that within this class of strategy profiles, the regular strategy
1Regardless, it is fairly easy to study all the PBEs which are not responsive by simply adding babbling periods in
any responsive PBE.
2By (essentially) unique, we mean that in any two regular strategy profiles, the actions of the players differ at only
measure zero sets and thus induce the same expected payoffs for the players.
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profile is the unique responsive PBE provided the discount factor is sufficiently high. More precisely,
our findings are as follows:
(iii) The regular strategy profile is the unique responsive PBE if the discount factor is sufficiently
high. In this setting, the regular strategy profile is stationary.
(iv) There are games that have no responsive PBE if the discount factor is small enough.
In the extreme case of infinite horizon where the payoffs are undiscounted, there does not exist any
responsive PBE. This is due to the fact that the sender does not have a best response when the
receiver is obeying, and hence, it should not be interpreted as a breakdown of communication.
1.2 Related literature
Crawford and Sobel [4] introduced a model of strategic information transmission. The model in which
the sender and the receiver interact only once is studied extensively, see [4, 10]. Recently a lot of work
has been focused on the dynamic extension, where the strategic interaction takes place repeatedly
either for finite or infinite number of periods, see [16, 9, 14, 1]. [16] assume that the sequence of
states follows an irreducible Markov chain. They characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as
players become very patient. [9] study finite horizon games, and show that, under certain conditions,
full information revelation is possible and conditioning future information release on past actions
improves incentives for information revelation.
Our paper relates to the large and growing literature of Bayesian persuasion, see [13, 6, 17, 11]. In
these settings, the informed advisor (i.e. the sender) decides how much information to share with a
less informed agent (i.e. the receiver) so as to influence his decision. [17] show that in many cases,
the optimal greedy disclosure policy for the sender exists, which at each stage, minimizes the amount
of information being disclosed in that stage under the constraint that it maximizes the current payoff
of the sender.
This paper also relates to the classical contributions on communication in games (see e.g. [8, 15]). In
[18, 3], the evolution of information flow is studied in the setting of strategic communication. Our
model is also linked to topics in computer science such as automated advice provision. For instance,
[2] use sender-receiver games to model interaction between computers and humans.
Most of the previous work has focused on the sender-receiver games with fixed duration of time.
Compared to these earlier papers, one of the main novelties of our model is that the game is a
stopping game. The receiver has the license to stop the game at any period of time. Some of the
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techniques we use (for example, backward induction) are also similar to the ones in the literature on
stopping games, see [20, 5].
In the responsive PBE, the receiver complies with the sender and the sender tries to maximize his
expected payoff without knowing the future states. Hence, our setting in a wider sense, is a variant
of the secretary problem, see [7].
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce the model and in the section 3, we
discuss the regular strategy profile. In sections 4 and 5 we state our main results for the finite horizon
and the infinite horizon respectively. In section 6, we give illustrative examples and in section 7, we
have concluding remarks. In section 8, we provide the proofs of the main theorems.
2 The model
In this section we describe the model of sender-receiver stopping games and the solution concept of
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
2.1 The game
We study sender-receiver stopping games. These are dynamic games played by two players, the sender
and the receiver, either with finite or infinite horizon.
An infinite horizon sender-receiver stopping game is played at periods in N = {1, 2, . . .}. At period
t ∈ N, play is as follows. First, a state of the world θt is drawn uniformly from the unit interval
I = [0, 1], independently of the earlier realizations θ1, . . . , θt−1. The sender learns θt, while the
receiver only knows the distribution of θt. Next, the sender chooses a message mt ∈ {mc,mq} and
sends it to the receiver. The message mt = mc is interpreted as a suggestion for the receiver to
continue at this period t and the message mt = mq as a suggestion to quit. On seeing the message,
the receiver chooses an action at ∈ {ac, aq}, where ac stands for continue and aq stands for quit. If the
receiver quits then the game ends at period t, whereas if the receiver continues then the game proceeds
to period t+1. If the game ends at period t, then the sender receives the payoff f t(θt) and the receiver
receives the payoff gt(θt). Here, f t and gt are two continuous and strictly increasing functions from
I to R+. If the receiver never quits, both players receive payoff zero, with f
t(0) = gt(0) = 0. For
each player, the outcome in which the receiver continues forever is worst. The payoff if the receiver
continues forever is zero for each player.
If there are functions f and g such that f t = f and gt = g for all periods t ∈ N, we say that the game
has period-independent payoffs. If there are functions f and g and δ ∈ (0, 1) such that f t = δt−1 · f
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and gt = δt−1 · g for all periods t ∈ N, we say that the game has discounted payoffs with discount
factor δ. In such cases, the functions f and g are called characteristic functions of the game. We
assume throughout the paper that payoffs are either period-independent or discounted.
The model description for sender-receiver stopping games on a finite horizon T ∈ N is almost identical
to the one above. The only modification is that if period T is reached then the game terminates at
the end of period T . Now we proceed with the description of sender-receiver stopping games on the
infinite horizon, without explicitly mentioning the changes for the finite horizon.
2.2 Strategies and expected payoffs
Histories. For the sender, a history at period t is a sequence hts = (θ
1,m1, . . . , θt−1,mt−1) of past
states and messages sent by the sender. By Hts = (I ×M)
t−1 we denote the set of histories for the
sender at period t. Given the usual topology on I, we endow Hts with the product Borel sigma-algebra.
Since the receiver does not observe the realization of the states, a history of the receiver at period t is
a sequence htr = (m
1, . . . ,mt−1) of past messages sent by the sender. By Htr = M
t−1 we denote the
set of histories for the receiver at period t. Note that Htr is a finite set.
Strategies. A strategy σ = (σt)∞t=1 for the sender is a sequence of measurable functions σ
t : Hts×I →
[0, 1]. The interpretation is that, at each period t, given the history hts and the state θ
t, the strategy
σt places probability σt(hts, θ
t) on the message mc.
A strategy τ = (τ t)∞t=1 for the receiver is a sequence of functions τ
t : Htr ×M → [0, 1]. We do not
need any measurability conditions for τ t as the domain of τ t is finite. The interpretation is that, at
each period t, given the history htr and the message m
t, the strategy τ t places probability τ t(htr,m
t)
on the action ac.
For the case when the game has a finite horizon T , for simplicity we require that at period T , regardless
the history, the sender’s strategy has to send the message mq and the receiver’s strategy has to play
the action aq.
In this model, we focus on the responsive strategies of the receiver. A strategy τ of the receiver is
called responsive if, for each period t (with t < T if the game has finite horizon T ) and history htr,
we have τ t(htr,mc) > τ
t(htr,mq). This is saying that, upon receiving the message mc, the receiver
chooses action ac with higher probability than upon receiving mq.
3
3The reason to restrict our attention to responsive strategies is to avoid PBEs in ‘babbling’ strategies, which are
fairly uninteresting from a game theory perspective.
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2.3 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
In this section we introduce the solution concept we use to analyse the sender-receiver stopping games
defined above.
Consider a strategy profile (σ, τ). The expected payoffs of the sender and the receiver are denoted by
Us(σ, τ) and Ur(σ, τ) respectively. If the receiver has not quit until some period t, and the histories
are hts and h
t
r respectively, then the continuation expected payoffs from period t onward are denoted
by U ts(σ, τ)(h
t
s) and U
t
r(σ, τ)(h
t
r) respectively. For details on the definitions of these notations, refer
to the Appendix B.
We say that, at period t, the expected payoff U ts(σ, τ) for the sender is history independent if for every
hts, h
t
s ∈ H
t
s it holds that U
t
s(σ, τ)(h
t
s) = U
t
s(σ, τ)(h
t
s). Note that history independence of U
t
s(σ, τ) is
equivalent to saying that the function U ts(σ, τ) is constant. In that case, with slight abuse of notation,
we identify the function with the (constant) value of that function, and act as if U ts(σ, τ) is a real
number instead of a function. A similar observation holds for the expected payoff U tr(σ, τ) for the
receiver.
Definition 1. A strategy profile (σ, τ) is called a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) if for every
period t, and every history hts, we have U
t
s(σ, τ)(h
t
s) ≥ U
t
s(σ
′, τ)(hts) for every strategy σ
′ of the sender,
and for every htr, U
t
r(σ, τ)(h
t
r) ≥ U
t
r(σ, τ
′)(htr) for every strategy τ
′ of the receiver. A PBE is called
responsive if the receiver’s strategy is responsive. 4
Notice that in the definition of PBE we do not explicitly talk about beliefs of the players on the realized
history consisting of the past states, messages and actions. Since the sender’s history contains all this
information, he is fully informed and he knows the history of the receiver. On the other hand, the
receiver is not informed of the past or current states. Based on his own history and the strategy
profile (σ, τ), he has a natural belief on the possible histories of the sender, which is compatible with
Bayesian updating. For details, we refer to Appendix A.
We will regularly make use of the fact that the well-known one-shot deviation principle holds in our
games whenever the game has a finite horizon (regardless whether the payoffs are period-independent
or discounted) or the game has infinite horizon and the payoffs are discounted. More precisely, in
these settings, a strategy profile (σ, τ) is a PBE if and only if (1) for every history hts of the sender,
we have U ts(σ, τ)(h
t
s) ≥ U
t
s(σ
′, τ)(hts) for every σ
′ that is a one-shot deviation from σ at hts, and (2)
similarly for the receiver. Here, for two strategies σ and σ′ and a history hts of the sender, σ
′ is called
4PBE is a refinement of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). Intuitively, it requires that the strategy profile induces
a BNE after any history.
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a one-shot deviation from σ at history hts if σ
′(h) = σ(h) for every history h 6= hts of the sender.
One-shot deviations are defined similarly for the receiver.
2.4 Terminology for strategies
A strategy σ for the sender is called pure if, for each period t, history hts and state θ
t, either σt(hts, θ
t) =
1 or σt(hts, θ
t) = 0. Pure strategies for the receiver are defined in a similar fashion.
A strategy σ for the sender is said to have a threshold at period t, if there exists a threshold βt ∈ [0, 1]
such that
σt(θt) =
{
1 if θt ∈ [0, βt)
0 if θt ∈ (βt, 1].
We do not specify what the strategy recommends when the state is exactly equal to the threshold,
for the sake of flexible exposition of our results. In any case, this occurs with probability zero only.
A strategy σ for the sender is called a threshold strategy if it has a threshold at each period t. A
threshold strategy σ is called stationary if βs = βt for all periods s and t.
A strategy profile (σ, τ) is called essentially Markov if U ts(σ, τ) and U
t
r(σ, τ) are history independent.
So the history at period t does not influence the continuation payoffs from period t onward, although
it still may influence the continuation strategies.
3 The regular strategy profile
The regular strategy profile plays a central role in our paper. A strategy profile (σ, τ) is called regular
if τ is the obedient strategy, and σ is sincere against τ . The obedient strategy τ for the receiver is
defined, for each period t and each history htr, by τ
t(htr,mc) = 1 and τ
t(htr,mq) = 0. The obedient
strategy is pure, and responsive.
For a given strategy τ of the receiver, a threshold strategy σ of the sender is called sincere against τ
at period t (with t < T if the game has finite horizon T ) if
[1] U t+1s (σ, τ) is history independent, and
[2] the strategy σ has the threshold αt at period t where αt is the solution to the equation f t(αt) =
U t+1s (σ, τ).
A threshold strategy σ is called sincere against τ if it is sincere against τ at each period t (with t < T
if the game has finite horizon T ).
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Notice that indeed the equation in condition [2] has a unique solution due to monotonicity of f t, and
the fact that, since payoffs are either period-independent or discounted, U t+1s (σ, τ) ≤ f
t(1).
In a regular strategy profile, the sender sends a sincere message whether or not he would like the
receiver to terminate the game at this period. Next paragraph provides intuitive explanation on why
the condition [2] achieves this.
Assume that (σ, τ) is a regular strategy profile such that σ has threshold αt at period t. If θt < αt,
then f t(θt) < f t(αt) = U t+1s (σ, τ). In this case the sender would like the receiver to continue the game
as the expected continuation payoff is higher than the expected payoff if the receiver quits. Indeed,
the strategy σ recommends the message mc as θ
t < αt and αt is the threshold. Similarly, if θt > αt,
then f t(θt) > f t(αt) = U t+1s (σ, τ) and σ recommends the message mq.
We argue in both the finite and the infinite horizon model that the regular strategy profile is (essen-
tially) unique, and entirely computable. To explain this, we define the auxiliary function H : I → I
by
H(x) = f−1
(
δ ·
[
x · f(x) +
∫ 1
x
f(θ)dθ
])
.
3.1 Finite horizon
Assume that the game has finite horizon T . Define the numbers β1, . . . , βT as follows5. First, βT = 0.
Then, using a backwards iteration, βt = H(βt+1) for all t = T − 1, . . . , 1. We have (cf. Lemma 8.1)
1 > β1 > β2 > · · · > βT = 0.
Proposition 1. Assume that the game has finite horizon T . Then the thresholds for the sender’s
strategy in the regular strategy profile are given by β1, . . . , βT respectively at periods 1, . . . , T .
Proof. Suppose that the players use a regular strategy profile (σ, τ). Assume that σ has a threshold
αt at each period t. Then, at each period t < T , with probability αt we have θt < αt and the
receiver continues. In this case the sender gets the expected continuation payoff U t+1s (σ, τ). Similarly,
with probability 1 − αt we have θt > αt and the receiver quits. In this case the sender gets the
expected continuation payoff 11−αt
∫ 1
αt
f t(θ)dθ. As σ is sincere against τ , we have f t(αt) = U t+1s (σ, τ)
for t = 1, . . . , T − 1. This yields the recursive equation
f t−1(αt−1) = U ts(σ, τ) = α
t · U t+1s (σ, τ) +
∫ 1
αt
f t(θ)dθ = αt · f t(αt) +
∫ 1
αt
f t(θ)dθ.
5 Note that βt depends on the horizon T . When needed we write βt(T ) instead of βt.
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Using the fact that f t = δt−1 · f in every period t, this can be rewritten to
αt−1 = f−1
(
δ ·
[
αt · f(αt) +
∫ 1
αt
f(θ)dθ
])
.
The last equation shows that αt−1 = H(αt) for t = 2, . . . , T . As the sender must send the message
mq at period T irrespective of the state, we have α
T = 0. So, we have αT = βT and inductively,
αt−1 = H(αt) = H(βt) = βt−1 for t = T, . . . , 2.
The numbers β1, . . . , βT can be computed recursively. Hence the regular strategy profile is entirely
computable. It is worth noting that the computation of the regular strategy profile only considers the
sender’s payoff function; the receiver’s payoff function does not play any role at all.
3.2 Infinite horizon
The function H has a unique fixed point, which is denoted by β (ref. Lemma 7.2).
Proposition 2. Assume that the game has infinite horizon. Then there is a unique regular strategy
profile. Moreover, this profile is stationary with threshold β.
Proof. Let (σ, τ) be a regular strategy profile. First note that the thresholds αt of the regular
strategy profile satisfy the recursive formula αt = H(αt+1) for all t.
We first show that, for each period t ∈ N we have αt ≤ β. Assume by way of contradiction that
for some t ∈ N, αt > β. We have αt = H(αt+1). By Lemma 7.3, H
(
αt
)
< αt = H(αt+1). This
implies αt < αt+1. In particular, αt+1 > β, and we can conclude that the sequence (αt
′
)∞t′=t is strictly
increasing.
By definition, αt ≤ 1 for each t ∈ N. Moreover, αt
′
= H
(
αt
′+1
)
≤ H(1) < 1 for each t′ > t. Hence,
the sequence converges, say to r < 1. Write
z = min{x−H(x) | x ∈ [αt, 1]}.
By Lemma 7.3, H(x) < x for x ≥ αt > β. So, by continuity of H , we know that z > 0. As the
sequence (αt
′
)∞t′=t converges to r, for ǫ =
z
2 , there exists N > 0 such that α
t′ ∈ [r− ǫ, r] for all t′ > N .
Then for any t′ > N , it holds that
αt
′+1 ≥ H
(
αt
′+1
)
+ z = αt
′
+ z ≥ r − ǫ+ z = r +
z
2
.
This contradicts the fact that αt
′+1 > β. Hence, αt ≤ β for each t ∈ N.
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We show that αt = β for each t ∈ N. Assume that αt < β for some t. As αt = H
(
αt+1
)
, by Lemma
7.3, αt+1 < β. So, the sequence (βt)∞t=1 is decreasing and bounded below by 0. Hence, the sequence
converges, say to r ≥ 0.
Take ε = 12 (H(r) − r). As before, we can conclude that ε > 0. As the sequence (α
t)∞t=1 converges to
r, we can find N > 0 such that αN − r < ǫ. Also, as the sequence is decreasing, r < αN+1 and hence
H(r) < H(αN+1). So, we have
H(r)− r < H(αN+1)− r = αN − r < ǫ =
1
2
(H(r) − r)
This is a contradiction. Hence, αt ≥ β. By the previous argument, it follows that αt = β.
The fixed point β can be computed by solving H(x) = x. Hence the regular strategy profile is entirely
computable. As in the finite horizon, the computation of the regular strategy profile only considers
the sender’s payoff function; the receiver’s payoff function does not play any role at all.
By Lemma 8.3. we have βt(T ) → β as T → ∞ for each t. So the following corollary is immediate
consequence of Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 1. Let (σT , τT ) be the regular strategy profile in the game with finite horizon T and (σ, τ) be
the regular strategy profile in the game with infinite horizon. Then the sequence (σT , τT )
∞
T=1 converges
to (σ, τ) as T →∞, when the payoffs are discounted or undiscounted.
4 Existence and unicity of PBE, finite horizon
In this section we consider the case where the game has some finite horizon T . We provide a existence
and unicity result for the PBE of the game. The result shows that, for any finite horizon, if the payoffs
are period-independent or they are discounted with a large discount factor, then the regular strategy
profile is the unique responsive PBE. This means that the strategy profile in which the receiver is
obedient and the sender is being sincere against this strategy of the receiver is the only PBE that is
responsive. We also show that existence of PBE may fail for small discount factors.
Define the function V : [0, 1]→ R by
V (x) =
1
x
·
∫ x
0
g(θ)dθ
and V (0) = 0. The amount V (x) is the expected payoff for the receiver if he quits, conditional on the
state being in [0, x]. For T ∈ N, let DT be the smallest number 6 in [0, 1] such that δ ·V (1) ≥ V (β1(T ))
for every δ ∈ [DT , 1].
6The number β1(T ) itself depends on the discount factor δ. Hence, DT does not have a simple closed formula. It
turns out that DT < 1.
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Theorem 3. Consider a sender-receiver stopping game with finite horizon T . Let the payoffs be either
period-independent or discounted with discount factor δ ≥ DT . Then, the regular strategy profile is
the unique responsive PBE.
Let D be the smallest number in [0, 1] such that δ · V (1) ≥ V (β) for every δ ∈ [D, 1]. If f is Lipschitz
at 1 then D < 1, as is shown by Lemma 9.2. Notice that if δ ≥ D, then the existence and unicity
holds regardless the horizon T of the game.
Theorem 4. Suppose that 0 < δ < D2. Then, for any T ≥ 2, the sender-receiver game with finite
horizon T does not admit a responsive PBE.
In these theorems, whether the regular strategy profile is a PBE (ref Theorem 3) or not (ref Theorem
4) depends on whether the receiver is patient enough, that is, whether the discount factor is sufficiently
high. In particular, it depends on whether he is willing to obey the sender and continue when the
state is small. How high the discount factor should be, depends on the curvature of the receiver’s
payoff function and the thresholds set by the sender.
In the following example, if the discount factor is small then receiver is not inclined to obey the sender
at period T − 1 when the state is small. Hence, the regular strategy profile is not a PBE.
Example 1. Consider the game with finite horizon T in which the payoff functions are δ discounted
with f(θ) = θ2 and g(θ) = θ. Then
H(x) =
√
δ · (1 + 2x3)
3
.
If the message sent by the sender at period T−1 ismc, then the state is in the interval [0, β
T−1]. So, the
payoff for the receiver on quitting is δT−2 ·V (βT−1) and the payoff on continuing is δT−1 ·V (1). Hence,
the receiver prefers to continue if δ · V (1) ≥ V (βT−1). We have βT−1 =
√
δ
3 . Further, V (x) =
x
2 .
Thus, the inequality δ · V (1) ≥ V (βT−1) is valid if and only if δ ≥ 13 . So, we get D
2 = 13 > 0. Hence,
if δ < 13 , the regular strategy profile is not a PBE. By Theorem 4, if δ <
1
3 then the game does not
admit a responsive PBE.
5 Existence and unicity of PBE, infinite horizon
Now we consider sender-receiver games with infinite horizon. Recall that if the receiver never quits
then both players get payoff zero. The payoffs are either period-independent or they are discounted.
For the discounted case with sufficiently large discount factors, we prove the existence of a unique
responsive PBE, which turns out to be stationary. Then, we show that if the payoffs are period-
independent then a PBE fails to exist.
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Theorem 5. Consider a sender-receiver stopping game with infinite horizon in which the payoffs are
discounted with discount factor δ ≥ D. Then the regular strategy profile is the unique responsive PBE
among the essentially Markov strategy profiles.
Note that, by Proposition 2, the regular strategy profile is stationary, with threshold β. Now we turn
to period-independent payoffs.
Theorem 6. Consider a sender-receiver stopping game with infinite horizon in which the payoffs are
period-independent. Then, there exists no responsive PBE within essentially Markov strategy profiles.
The result of theorem 6 is driven by the following observation. At period 1, it has probability 1 that
a state strictly less than 1 is realized. Since the horizon of the game is infinite, the sender knows
that if both players wait sufficiently long, then a strictly better state will be realized later on. Hence,
he would like the game to continue. Since this argument holds for each period, the sender is never
satisfied. In fact, the players can get payoffs arbitrarily close to f(1) and g(1), but with probability 1
they can not get them exactly. Note that in the regular strategy profile, the threshold in the sender’s
strategy would be 1 at each period.
The following Corollary is the immediate consequence of Corollary 1 and Theorems 3, 5 and 6.
Corollary 2. If the payoffs are discounted (δ < 1), the sequence of PBEs in the finite horizon games
converges to a PBE in the infinite horizon game. If the payoffs are undiscounted (δ = 1), the sequence
of PBE in the finite horizon games converges to the regular strategy profile in the infinite horizon
game which is not a PBE.
6 Examples
In this section we illustrate our results with the help of the examples. We consider a sender-receiver
stopping game in which the payoffs are either period-independent (δ = 1) or discounted with discount
factor δ ∈ (0, 1). As discussed before, the regular strategy profile is determined solely by the payoffs
of the sender.
Example 2. f(x) = x2 and g(x) = x. The function H can be calculated as H(x) =
√
δ · 1+2x
3
3 .
We first consider the setting in which the game has a finite horizon T . By definition, we have βT (T ) = 0
and for each t < T , βt(T ) = H(βt+1(T )). By Proposition 1, the game has a unique regular strategy
profile. In this profile, the receiver plays the obeying strategy and the sender plays the sincere strategy
(against the receiver’s strategy) with threshold βt(T ) at period t.
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Figure 1: f(x) = x2, δ = 0.8
Now as g(x) = x, the function V can be calculated as V (x) = x2 . Recall from Section 4 that the bound
DT is defined as the smallest number such that δ · V (1) ≥ V (β1(T )) for δ ∈ [DT , 1]. The inequality
simplifies to δ ≥ β1(T ).
If the horizon T = 3, then β3(3) = 0, β2(3) =
√
δ
3 and β
1(3) =
√
3
√
3·δ+2·δ2.5
9
√
3
. The inequality
δ ≥ β1(3) is satisfied if and only if δ ∈ [D3, 1] and in this example, D3 ≈ 0.361. Hence, if δ ∈ [D3, 1],
the regular strategy profile is a unique responsive PBE (ref. Theorem 3). If T = 2, then β1(2) =
√
δ
3
and D2 = 13 . So, the regular strategy profile is a unique responsive PBE for δ ∈ [D
2, 1]. For T ≥ 2,
if δ ∈ (0, D2), the game has no responsive PBE among the essentially Markov strategy profiles (ref.
Theorem 4).
Now we consider the setting in which the game has infinite horizon. By Proposition 2, the game has a
unique regular strategy profile. In this profile, the receiver plays the obeying strategy and the sender
plays the sincere strategy (against the receiver’s strategy) with threshold β at each period t. Here β
is the unique solution in [0, 1] to the equation H(x) = x.
We have H(β) = β, which can be rewritten as δ = 3β
2
1+2β3 . For δ < 1, we have β < 1. Recall from
Section 5 that the bound D is defined as the smallest number such that δ ·V (1) ≥ V (β) for δ ∈ [D, 1].
The inequality is equivalent to δ ≥ β. This holds if and only if δ ∈ [D, 1]. In this example, D solves
the equation 2δx3 − 3x2 + δ = 0. Hence, D ≈ 0.366. So, if δ ∈ [D, 1), the regular strategy profile is a
unique responsive PBE (ref. Theorem 5).
If the payoffs are period independent, i.e. δ = 1, then by Theorem 6, there is no responsive PBE
among the essentially Markov strategy profiles. Indeed, in this case, we have β = 1. So, according to
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the regular strategy profile, the sender sends the message mc whenever the state is less than 1 and
the receiver obeys. Hence, the game is played forever with probability 1, and the expected payoff is
0 for both the players.
Example 3. Here we assume f(x) = x2 and g(x) = x3. As the payoff function of the sender is same
as in Example 1, so is the unique regular strategy profile. As g(x) = x3, we have V (x) = x
3
4 . In this
case, we have DT = 0 for each T ≥ 1 and D = 0. Hence, in the setting of the game with a finite
horizon T (for T ≥ 1), the regular strategy profile is the unique responsive PBE for δ ∈ (0, 1] and in
the setting of the game with the infinite horizon, the regular strategy profile is the unique responsive
PBE for δ ∈ (0, 1).
7 Concluding remarks
This paper shows that the model of sender-receiver stopping games differs from the other models
of dynamic sender-receiver games in the literature. The striking feature about this model stated by
our main results is that under the responsive PBE the sender plays the threshold strategy optimal
for himself and the receiver simply obeys. This is surprising, as the receiver has to comply with the
sender regardless his own payoff function. Under the responsive PBE the sender gets the maximum
possible payoff for himself. Hence, the delegation of the decision making to the receiver does not hurt
the sender.
We see many interesting open question to be addressed in future work. One immediate question
would be the extension to arbitrary distributions of the state of the world. The simple case in which
nature draws an iid state from a strictly increasing continuous distribution is discussed in Appendix
C. A challenging future extension would be the case in which the state of the world follows a Markov
chain. We are currently investigating the situation with multiple senders, so that the receiver can
make better informed decisions.
8 The proofs
8.1 The proof of Theorem 3
We will prove Theorem 3 in two parts: Claim 1 and Claim 2. So we fix a sender-receiver stopping game
with finite horizon T , and with payoffs that are period-independent (δ = 1) or they are discounted
with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Claim 1. Let δ ∈ [DT , 1]. Suppose that τ is responsive. If the strategy profile (σ, τ) is a PBE, then
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(σ, τ) is regular.
Proof. Fix δ ∈ [DT , 1]. Suppose that (σ, τ) is a PBE with τ being responsive. We will prove that
(σ, τ) is regular. We shall do so by proving that the sender’s strategy σ is sincere and the receiver’s
strategy τ is obedient at each period t = 1, . . . , T − 1. We apply backward induction by considering
the periods in the order T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1.
We recall from Section 2.2 that at period t, the expected payoffs U ts(σ, τ) and U
t
r(σ, τ) are functions
of the histories of the sender and the receiver respectively.
For t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1, let Q(t) be the following list of statements:
[1] σ is sincere at period t, and the corresponding threshold is equal to βt.
[2] U t+1r (σ, τ) >
1
βt
∫ βt
0
gt(θ)dθ.
[3] U t+1r (σ, τ) <
1
1−βt ·
∫ 1
βt
gt(θ)dθ.
[4] τ is obedient at period t. That is, for each history htr, τ
t(htr,mc) = 1 and τ
t(htr,mq) = 0.
[5] U ts(σ, τ) and U
t
r(σ, τ) do not depend on history up to period t.
For ease of notation, and suppressing possible history dependence, for every period t = 1, . . . , T let
pt = τ t(htr,mc) be the probability on the action ac on seeing the message mc, and let q
t = τ t(htr,mq)
be the probability on the action ac on seeing the message mq. As τ is responsive, we know that
pt > qt.
Remark on period T . The final period is a special case. At this period the sender always sends
message mq and the receiver always chooses action aq. So, U
T
s (σ, τ) and U
T
r (σ, τ) are independent of
the history up to period T .
The induction step. We assume that Q(t+ 1), . . . , Q(T − 1) are true, for some t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}.
We show that Q(t) is also true.
Item [1] of Q(t). First we show that βt is the (unique) solution to the equation f t(x) = U t+1s (σ, τ).
For t = T − 1 we have
UTs (σ, τ) =
∫ 1
0
fT (θ)dθ
= δT−1 ·
∫ 1
0
f(θ)dθ = δT−2 · f(H(0))
= δT−2 · f(H(βT )) = δT−2 · f(βT−1)
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= fT−1(βT−1).
Now consider the case when t ≤ T − 2. By item [5] of Q(t + 1), the expected payoff U t+1s (σ, τ) is
independent of the history up to period t + 1. By item [5] of Q(t + 2) when t ≤ T − 3 and by the
remark on period T when t = T − 2, the expected payoff U t+2s (σ, τ) is independent of the history up
to period t+ 2. We have
U t+1s (σ, τ) = β
t+1 · U t+2s (σ, τ) +
∫ 1
βt+1
f t+1(θ)dθ
= βt+1 · f t+1(βt+1) +
∫ 1
βt+1
f t+1(θ)dθ
= δt−1 · δ ·
[
βt+1 · f(βt+1) +
∫ 1
βt+1
f(θ)dθ
]
= δt−1 · f(H(βt+1))
= δt−1 · f(βt)
= f t(βt).
For the first equality, we use items [1] and [4] of Q(t+ 1). For the second equality, we use item [1] of
Q(t+ 1) and the definition of sincere strategy. For the fifth equality, we use the definition of βt.
Thus, when θt < βt, the sender expects to get a strictly better payoff if the receiver continues than
when the receiver quits. As pt > qt, the sender strictly prefers to send the message mc over mq if
θt < βt. By the same reasoning, the sender strictly prefers to send the message mq over mc if θ
t > βt.
Hence, σ is sincere at period t with threshold value βt.
Item [2] of Q(t). Quitting at period t + 1 guarantees payoff
∫ 1
0 g
t+1(θ)dθ for the receiver. So by
using Lemma 8.2, we get
1
βt
·
∫ βt
0
gt(θ)dθ <
∫ 1
0
gt+1(θ)dθ ≤ U t+1r (σ, τ).
This proves item [2] of Q(t).
Item [3] of Q(t). For t = T − 1, by using Lemma 10, we have
UTr (σ, τ) =
∫ 1
0
gT (θ)dθ ≤
∫ 1
0
gT−1(θ)dθ <
1
1− βT−1
·
∫ 1
βT−1
gT−1(θ)dθ.
For t < T − 1 we have
U t+1r (σ, τ) = β
t+1 · U t+2r (σ, τ) +
∫ 1
βt+1
gt+1(θ)dθ
<
1
1− βt+1
·
∫ 1
βt+1
gt+1(θ)dθ
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≤
1
1− βt+1
·
∫ 1
βt+1
gt(θ)dθ
<
1
1− βt
·
∫ 1
βt
gt(θ)dθ.
In the equality, we use items [1] and [4] of Q(t+1). In the first inequality, we use item [3] of Q(t+1).
For the last inequality, we use Lemmas 8.1 and 10.
Item [4] of Q(t). Assume the message is mc at period t. Then by item [1] of Q(t), we have
θt ∈ [0, βt]. We want to show that τ plays action ac at period t. The expected payoff for the receiver
on quitting is 1
βt
∫ βt
0 g
t(θ)dθ. By item [2] of Q(t) we have
U t+1r (σ, τ) >
1
βt
∫ βt
0
gt(θ)dθ.
Since (σ, τ) is a PBE, τ has to play action ac at period t.
Now, assume the message is mq at period t. Then by item [1] of Q(t), we have θ
t ∈ [βt, 1]. We
want to show that τ plays action aq at period t. The expected payoff for the receiver on quitting is
1
1−βt
∫ 1
βt
gt(θ)dθ. By [3] of Q(t) we have
U t+1r (σ, τ) <
1
1− βt
∫ 1
βt
gt(θ)dθ.
Since (σ, τ) is a PBE, τ has to play action aq at period t.
Item [5] of Q(t). By using items [1] and [4] of Q(t), . . . , Q(T − 1) and the remark on period T , the
statement follows immediately.
Claim 2. Let δ ∈ [DT , 1]. Then the regular strategy profile is a PBE.
Proof. Let (σ, τ) be regular. Then the expected payoffs U ts(σ, τ) and U
t
r(σ, τ) are independent of
the history up to period t− 1 for all periods t = 1, . . . , T . We show that (σ, τ) is a PBE in four steps.
Step 1. We show that, for all t = 1, . . . , T , the threshold used by σ at period t is exactly βt.
Proof of step 1. The proof is by backward induction. At period T , by definition, σ uses threshold
βT = 0.
Now assume that at some period t = 2, . . . , T , the strategy σ uses threshold βt. We argue that the
threshold of σ at period t− 1 is βt−1. We have
U ts(σ, τ) = β
t · U t+1s (σ, τ) +
∫ 1
βt
f t(θ)dθ
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= βt · f t(βt) +
∫ 1
βt
f t(θ)dθ
= δt−1 ·
[
βt · f(βt) +
∫ 1
βt
f(θ)dθ
]
= δt−1 ·G(βt) = δt−2 · f(H(βt))
= δt−2 · f(βt−1) = f t−1(βt−1).
In the first equality, we use that σ uses threshold βt and τ is obedient at period t. In the second
equality, we use that σ is sincere at period t. In the sixth equality, we use the definition of βt−1.
Since σ is sincere at period t−1, the threshold at period t−1 must be βt−1, as desired. This completes
the proof of step 1.
Step 2. For each period t = 1, . . . , T − 1, let Q(t) be the statement that the following conditions
hold:
[1] If the receiver gets the message mq at period t, then
U t+1r (σ, τ) <
1
1− βt
·
∫ 1
βt
gt(θ)dθ.
[2] If the receiver gets the message mc at period t, then
U t+1r (σ, τ) >
1
βt
∫ βt
0
gt(θ)dθ.
We prove that Q(t) holds for all t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
Proof of step 2. The proof is by backward induction. First we consider period T − 1. We have by
Lemma 10
UTr (σ, τ) =
∫ 1
0
gT (θ)dθ ≤
∫ 1
0
gT−1(θ)dθ <
1
1− βT−1
·
∫ 1
βT−1
gT−1(θ)dθ,
which proves item [1] of the statement Q(T − 1). Item [2] of the statement Q(T − 1) follows from
Lemma 8.2.
Now assume that Q(t+ 1) is true, where t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 2}. We prove that Q(t) also holds.
First we prove the item [1] of Q(t). We have
U t+1r (σ, τ) = β
t+1 · U t+2r (σ, τ) +
∫ 1
βt+1
gt+1(θ)dθ
≤ βt+1 ·
1
1− βt+1
·
∫ 1
βt+1
gt+1(θ)dθ +
∫ 1
βt+1
gt+1(θ)dθ
=
1
1− βt+1
·
∫ 1
βt+1
gt+1(θ)dθ
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≤
1
1− βt+1
·
∫ 1
βt+1
gt(θ)dθ
<
1
1− βt
·
∫ 1
βt
gt(θ)dθ.
In the first equality, we use that, by step 1, σ uses threshold βt+1 and τ is obedient at period t+ 1.
In the first inequality, we use item [1] of Q(t + 1). In the last inequality, we use Lemma 10 and the
fact that βt > βt+1. This completes the proof of item [1] of Q(t).
Now we prove the item [2] of Q(t). We have
U t+1r (σ, τ) = β
t+1 · U t+2r (σ, τ) +
∫ 1
βt+1
gt+1(θ)dθ
≥ βt+1 ·
1
βt+1
·
∫ βt+1
0
gt+1(θ)dθ +
∫ 1
βt+1
gt+1(θ)dθ
=
∫ 1
0
gt+1(θ)dθ
>
1
βt
·
∫ βt
0
gt(θ)dθ.
In the first equality, we use that, by step 1, σ uses threshold βt+1 and τ is obedient at period t+ 1.
In the first inequality, we use item [2] of Q(t + 1). In the second inequality, we use the Lemma 8.2.
This completes the proof of item [2] of Q(t).
Step 3. We prove that, starting from any period t = 1, . . . , T , the obedient strategy τ of the receiver
is a best response against the sincere strategy σ of the sender.
Proof of step 3. At any period t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, consider the case where the receives gets message
mq. We show that it is a (unique) best response for the receiver to play aq. That is, τ plays a best
response at period t.
Because the receiver gets the message mq at period t, we have by step 1 that θ
t ∈ [βt, 1]. So, the
expected payoff for the receiver on quitting is 11−βt
∫ 1
βt
gt(θ)dθ. By step 2, we have
U t+1r (σ, τ) <
1
1− βt
·
∫ 1
βt
gt(θ)dθ.
Hence, it is a best response for the receiver to play aq.
Now at any period t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, consider the case where the receives gets message mc. We show
that it is a (unique) best response for the receiver to play ac. That is, τ plays a best response at
period t.
Because the receiver gets the message mc at period t, we have by step 1 that θ
t ∈ [0, βt]. So, the
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expected payoff for the receiver on quitting is 1
βt
∫ βt
0 g
t(θ)dθ. By step 2, we have
U t+1r (σ, τ) >
1
βt
·
∫ βt
0
gt(θ)dθ.
Hence, it is a best response for the receiver to play ac.
Step 4. As the final step, we argue that (σ, τ) is a PBE.
Proof of step 4. By step 3, at any period, τ is best response against σ. Conversely, we show that σ is
a best response against τ . Recall that for each period t = 1, . . . , T − 1, the expected payoff U t+1s (σ, τ)
is history independent. Since τ is obedient, the sender receives payoff f t(θt) if σ sends mq at period
t and payoff U t+1s (σ, τ) if σ sends mc. So, the sender plays a best response at period t when he sends
mc if f
t(θt) < U t+1s (σ, τ) and mq if f
t(θt) > U t+1s (σ, τ). Hence, since U
t+1
s (σ, τ) = f
t(βt), the sender
plays a best response at period t when he sends mc if θ
t < βt and mq if θ
t > βt. Thus, by step 1, the
strategy σ is a best response against τ at period t. This completes the proof of the theorem.
8.2 The proof of Theorem 4
In this section we prove Theorem 4. So, let f and g be strictly increasing functions from I to R+ with
f(0) = g(0) = 0. Consider a finite horizon T ≥ 2. Assume by way of contradiction that a strategy
profile (σ, τ) is a PBE where τ is a responsive strategy.
As the receiver must quit at period T , we have UTs (σ, τ) =
∫ 1
0
δT−1f(θ)dθ. Let αT−1 = f−1
(
δ ·∫ 1
0
f(θ)dθ
)
. At period T − 1, if the receiver quits, the sender obtains the payoff fT−1(θT−1) and if
the receiver continues, the sender obtains the expected payoff UTs (σ, τ). As τ is responsive, the sender
strictly prefers to send the message mc if θ
T−1 < αT−1 and the message mq if θT−1 > αT−1. Hence,
the strategy σ has a threshold αT−1 at period T − 1.
Assume that the receiver gets the message mc at period T − 1. As α
T−1 > 0, this happens with
positive probability. If the receiver continues, he obtains the expected payoff
UTr (σ, τ) =
∫ 1
0
δT−1g(θ)dθ = δT−1 · V (1).
And if the receiver quits, he obtains the expected payoff
1
αT−1
∫ αT−1
0
δT−2g(θ)dθ = δT−2 · V (αT−1).
As δ < D2, we have δ · V (1) < V (αT−1). So, the receiver strictly prefers to quit on receiving the
message mc. This is however in contradiction with τ being responsive. So, the game admits no
responsive PBE.
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8.3 The proof of Theorem 5
We will prove Theorem 5 in two parts: Claim 3 and Claim 4. So we fix a sender-receiver stopping
game with infinite horizon and with payoffs that are discounted with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Claim 3. Suppose that δ ∈ (D, 1). Let (σ, τ) be an essentially Markov PBE where τ is responsive.
Then, (σ, τ) is the regular strategy profile.
Proof. Suppose that δ ∈ (D, 1). Let (σ, τ) be an essentially Markov PBE where τ is responsive.
Again, let pt = τ t(htr,mc) be the probability on the action ac on seeing the message mc, and let
qt = τ t(htr,mq) be the probability on the action ac on seeing the message mq. Since τ is responsive,
pt > qt for each t. We prove the statement in a series of steps.
Step 1. The strategy σ has threshold αt at each period t ∈ N that satisfies f t(αt) = U t+1s (σ, τ).
Hence, σ is sincere.
Proof of step 1. Fix a period t ∈ N. Since (σ, τ) is essentially Markov, U t+1s (σ, τ) is independent of
the history up to period t+ 1. Further, note that f t(1) > f t+1(1) ≥ U t+1s (σ, τ) ≥ 0 = f
t(0). So, the
equation f t(x) = U t+1s (σ, τ) has the unique solution, say α
t ∈ [0, 1).
Assume first that θt < αt. Then, f t(θt) < f t(αt) = U t+1s (σ, τ). Thus, the sender expects to get a
strictly better payoff when the receiver continues than when the receiver quits. As pt > qt, the sender
strictly prefers to send the message mc over mq. Because (σ, τ) is a PBE, σ sends the message mc at
period t.
Assume now that θt > αt. Then, f t(θt) > f t(αt) = U t+1s (σ, τ). By the same reasoning, σ sends the
message mq at period t. Thus, σ is sincere at period t with threshold α
t. This completes the proof of
step 1.
Step 2. Define for each period t ∈ N
K(t) =
1
αt
·
∫ αt
0
gt(θ)dθ and L(t) =
1
1− αt
·
∫ 1
αt
gt(θ)dθ
Then, for every t ∈ N we have K(t) ≤ U t+1r (σ, τ) ≤ L(t).
Proof of step 2. Fix t ∈ N. As τ is responsive, we know that 1 ≥ pt > qt ≥ 0. We know that at
period t, the strategy σ uses threshold αt. So, K(t) is the expected payoff to the receiver when he
quits, upon getting the message mc. Since p
t > 0, it follows that K(t) ≤ U t+1r (σ, τ). Similarly, L(t)
is the expected payoff to the receiver when he quits, upon getting the message mq. Since q
t < 1, it
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follows that U t+1r (σ, τ) ≤ L(t). This completes the proof of step 2.
Step 3. For each period t ∈ N we have αt ≤ β.
Proof of Step 3. Fix t ∈ N. Suppose by way of contradiction that αt > β. Note that
f t(αt) = U t+1s (σ, τ)
≤ αt+1 · U t+2s (σ, τ) +
∫ 1
αt+1
f t+1(θ)dθ
= αt+1 · f t+1(αt+1) +
∫ 1
αt+1
f t+1(θ)dθ
= δt ·G(αt+1).
The first and second equalities follow from the definitions of αt and αt+1 and the last equality from
the definition of G. The inequality can be explained as follows. If θt+1 < αt+1, which has probability
αt+1, then the sender’s payoff is at most U t+2s (σ, τ) (which is realized if the receiver continues). If
θt+1 > αt+1, which has probability 1−αt+1, then the sender’s payoff is at most 11−αt+1
∫ 1
αt+1
f t+1(θ)dθ
(which is realized if the receiver quits).
It follows that f(αt) ≤ δ · G(αt+1). So, αt ≤ H(αt+1). As αt > β by assumption, by Lemma
7.3, H
(
αt
)
< αt ≤ H(αt+1). This implies αt < αt+1 and so αt+1 > α. Repeating the whole
argument for t + 1, we get αt+2 > αt+1 > β. And hence iterating the argument, we can conclude
that the sequence (αt
′
)∞t′=t is strictly increasing. By definition, α
t ≤ 1 for each t ∈ N. Moreover,
αt
′
≤ H
(
αt
′+1
)
≤ H(1) for each t′ > t. Hence, the sequence (αt
′
)∞t′=t converges to some r ≤ H(1) < 1.
Denote z = min {x −H(x) : x ∈ [αt, 1]}. By Lemma 7.3, H(x) < x for x ≥ αt > β. By continuity
of H , we have z > 0. As the sequence (αt
′
)∞t′=t converges to r, for ǫ =
z
2 , there exists N > 0 such that
αt
′
∈ [r − ǫ, r] for all t′ > N . Now for any fixed t′ > N , we have αt
′+1 ≥ H
(
αt
′+1
)
+ z ≥ αt
′
+ z ≥
r − ǫ+ z = r + z2 , hence α
t′+1 ≥ r. This is a contradiction. This completes the proof of step 3.
Step 4. The strategy τ is obedient.
Proof of Step 4.
Step 4.1: We show that τ t(htr,mc) = p
t = 1 for every period t and history htr of the receiver. Take
any t ∈ N. It is sufficient to show that K(t) < U t+1r (σ, τ). By step 3, α
t ≤ β. It holds that
K(t) =
1
αt
·
∫ αt
0
gt(θ)dθ ≤
1
β
·
∫ β
0
gt(θ)dθ <
∫ 1
0
gt+1(θ)dθ ≤ U t+1r (σ, τ).
In the first inequality, we use Lemma 10. In the second inequality, we use Lemma 9.3 and the
assumption δ · V (1) > V (β). Due to (σ, τ) being a PBE, the last inequality follows because quitting
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at period t + 1 cannot be better for the receiver than playing τ against σ. This completes the proof
of step 4.1.
Step 4.2: We show that τ t(htr,mq) = q
t = 0 for every period t and history htr of the receiver. For
every t ∈ N, let Q(t) be the the statement U t+1r (σ, τ) < L(t). As (σ, τ) is a PBE, Q(t) implies that
qt = 0. It is sufficient to show that Q(t) is true for every t ∈ N.
Step 4.2.1: We show that Q(t+1) implies Q(t). Suppose that Q(t+1) is true, so qt+1 = 0. Together
with step 4.1, it follows that τ is obedient at period t+ 1. Then
f t(αt) = U t+1s (σ, τ)
= αt+1 · U t+2s (σ, τ) +
∫ 1
αt+1
f t+1(θ)dθ
= αt+1 · f t+1(αt+1) +
∫ 1
αt+1
f t+1(θ)dθ
= δt ·G(αt+1).
The first and third equalities follow from the definitions of αt and αt+1 and the last equality from the
definition of G. The second equality follows from τ being obedient at period t+ 1.
It follows that αt = H(αt+1). By step 3, we have αt ≤ β. Hence by Lemma 7.3, αt ≥ αt+1. Then,
U t+1r (σ, τ) = α
t+1 · U t+2r (σ, τ) +
∫ 1
αt+1
gt+1(θ)dθ
<
αt+1
1− αt+1
·
∫ 1
αt+1
gt+1(θ)dθ +
∫ 1
αt+1
gt+1(θ)dθ
=
1
1− αt+1
·
∫ 1
αt+1
gt+1(θ)dθ
≤
1
1− αt
·
∫ 1
αt
gt+1(θ)dθ
<
1
1− αt
·
∫ 1
αt
gt(θ)dθ
= L(t).
In the first inequality we use that the statement Q(t + 1) is true. In the second inequality we use
Lemma 10, which is applicable as αt ≥ αt+1 by step 3. This completes the proof of step 4.2.1.
Step 4.2.2 We prove that Q(t) is true for every t. Assume by way of contradiction that there is
a t ∈ N for which Q(t) is not true. By step 4.2.1, Q(t′) is not true for all t′ ≥ t. Then, by step 2,
U t
′+1
r (σ, τ) = L(t
′) for all t′ ≥ t. Denote by Et+1r the expected payoff of the receiver conditional on
getting the message mq at period t+ 1. We have
Et+1r = q
t+1 · U t+2r (σ, τ) + (1− q
t+1) · L(t+ 1)
= qt+1 · U t+2r (σ, τ) + (1− q
t+1) · U t+2r (σ, τ)
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= U t+2r (σ, τ).
The first equality can be explained as follows. On receiving the message mq at period t + 1, the
strategy τ continues with probability qt+1 and on continuing the receiver gets the payoff U t+2r (σ, τ),
whereas τ quits with probability 1 − qt+1 and on quitting the receiver gets the payoff L(t + 1). It
follows that
U t+1r (σ, τ) = α
t+1 · U t+2r (σ, τ) + (1− α
t+1) · Et+1r = U
t+2
r (σ, τ).
In the first equality we use the step 4.1.
So, U t+1r (σ, τ) = U
t+2
r (σ, τ). Iterating this argument implies that U
t+1
r (σ, τ) = U
t+j
r (σ, τ) for any j.
As U t+jr ≤ g
t+j(1) = δt+j−1g(1), it then follows that U t+1r (σ, τ) = 0. However, if the receiver quits at
period t+1 instead, regardless of the message, then he receives the expected payoff
∫ 1
0
gt+1(θ)dθ > 0.
This contradicts the assumption that (σ, τ) is PBE. This completes the proof of step 4.2.2.
Now Claim 3 follows immediately from Proposition 2.
Claim 4. Suppose that δ ∈ (D, 1). Then the regular strategy profile is a PBE.
Proof. Let δ ∈ (D, 1) and let (σ, τ) be the regular strategy profile. From Proposition 2, σ is
stationary with threshold β. Clearly, U t+1r (σ, τ) = δ · U
t
r(σ, τ) for all periods t ∈ N. We show that
(σ, τ) is a PBE.
Since (σ, τ) is regular, we have
U tr(σ, τ) = β · U
t+1
r (σ, τ) +
∫ 1
β
gt(θ)dθ = β · δ · U tr(σ, τ) +
∫ 1
β
gt(θ)dθ.
It follows that
U tr(σ, τ) =
δt−1
1− δ · β
·
∫ 1
β
g(θ)dθ. (1)
Now we show that the receiver prefers to play aq on seeing mq at period t. For this, we need to show
that
U t+1r (σ, τ) ≤
δt−1
1− β
∫ 1
β
g(θ)dθ.
This follows easily from (1).
Finally, we show that the receiver prefers to play ac on seeing mc at period t. For this, we need to
show that
U t+1r (σ, τ) ≥
δt−1
β
∫ β
0
g(θ)dθ.
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Using (1), the above inequality can be rewritten to
1
β
·
∫ β
0
g(θ)dθ < δ ·
∫ 1
0
g(θ)dθ.
This follows from Lemma 9.3 and the condition V (β) < δ · V (1), which is due to δ ∈ (D, 1).
8.4 The proof of Theorem 6
In this section, we prove Theorem 6. By way of contradiction, assume that (σ, τ) is an essentially
Markov strategy profile and a responsive PBE. For every period t, let pt = τ t(htr,mc) be the probability
on the action ac on seeing the message mc, and let q
t = τ t(htr,mq) be the probability on the action
ac on seeing the message mq. As τ is responsive, we know that p
t > qt.
Step 1. We prove that the sender’s strategy σ is a threshold strategy with some threshold αt ∈ (0, 1)
at each period t.
Proof of step 1. Fix a period t ∈ N. Since (σ, τ) is essentially Markov, U t+1s (σ, τ) is independent
of the history up to period t + 1. The equation f(x) = U t+1s (σ, τ) has a unique solution α
t ∈ [0, 1].
Notice that f(0) < U t+1s (σ, τ) < f(1) because state 0 are 1 have probability zero. Hence, α
t ∈ (0, 1).
Assume first that θt < αt. Then, f(θt) < f(αt) = U t+1s (σ, τ). Thus, the sender expects to get a
strictly better payoff when the receiver continues than when the receiver quits. As pt > qt, the sender
strictly prefers to send the message mc over mq. Because (σ, τ) is a PBE, σ sends the message mc at
period t.
Assume now that θt > αt. Then, f(θt) > f(αt) = U t+1s (σ, τ). By the same reasoning, σ sends the
message mq at period t. This completes the proof of step 1.
Step 2. We show that for every period t, we have pt = 1.
Suppose that σ sends the message mc at period t. Then, θ
t ≤ αt. If the receiver quits at period t, his
expected payoff is
∫ αt
0 g(θ)dθ. However, if the receiver continues at period t and quits at period t+ 1
irrespective of the message by the sender, his expected payoff is
∫ 1
0
g(θ)dθ, which is strictly better
because αt < 1 due to step 1. So, action aq is not a best response for the receiver. It follows that
pt = 1.
Step 3. We show that
∑∞
t=1(1 − q
t) =∞.
Let zt denote the probability under (σ, τ) that the receiver continues at period t, conditional on
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reaching period t. Thus, zt = αt · pt + (1− αt) · qt.
We show that Π∞t=1z
t = 0. Assume by way of contradiction that Π∞t=1z
t > 0. Because
Π∞t=1z
t = Πnt=1z
t · Π∞t=n+1z
t
and Πnt=1z
t → Π∞t=1z
t as n → ∞, we have Π∞t=n+1z
t → 1 as n → ∞. So, there is large period t such
that conditional on reaching period t, the receiver’s expected payoff U tr(σ, τ) is less than
∫ 1
0
g(θ)dθ.
As the receiver can always guarantee an expected payoff of
∫ 1
0 g(θ)dθ by simply quitting, regardless
the message sent by the sender, this is a contradiction. Hence, Π∞t=1z
t = 0.
Because zt = αt ·pt+(1−αt) · qt, by steps 1 and 2, we can conclude that zt > 0. Because Π∞t=1z
t = 0,
we obtain
∑∞
t=1(1 − z
t) =∞. As pt > qt, we also have zt > qt. Hence,
∑∞
t=1(1− q
t) =∞.
Step 4. We derive a contradiction.
Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1). We define a threshold strategy σǫ for the sender as follows: at each period t, if θ
t < 1−ǫ
then σǫ sends the message mc and if θ
t ≥ 1− ǫ then σǫ sends the message mq.
We show that the sender’s expected payoff under (σǫ, τ) is at least f(1 − ǫ). For this it is sufficient
to prove that, under (σǫ, τ), with probability 1 the receiver will eventually quit. Let z
t
ǫ denote the
probability under (σǫ, τ) that the receiver continues at period t, conditional on reaching period t. By
step 2, ztǫ = (1− ǫ) · p
t+ ǫ · qt = (1− ǫ)+ ǫ · qt. Thus, by step 3,
∑∞
t=1(1− z
t
ǫ) = ǫ ·
∑∞
t=1(1− q
t) =∞.
As ztǫ > 0 for each t, we obtain Π
∞
t=1z
t
ǫ = 0. Thus, under (σǫ, τ), with probability 1 the receiver will
eventually quit.
Since the sender can guarantee, for every ǫ ∈ (0, 1), an expected payoff of at least f(1 − ǫ) against
τ , the sender’s expected payoff under (σ, τ) must be at least f(1). Since the state 1 is realized with
probability 0, this is a contradiction. This concludes the proof.
Appendix
A. The receiver’s belief on the history of the sender
In this appendix, we describe the receiver’s conditional probability distribution (or belief) Pσ,τ,ht
r
on
the set Hts of possible histories for the sender, given the strategy profile (σ, τ) and the receiver’s history
htr = (m
1,m2, . . . ,mt−1).
Let σk(mk|hks , θ
k) denote the probability on the message mk under the strategy σ, given the history
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hks and the state θ
k. For numbers y1, y2, . . . , yt−1 ∈ [0, 1], the expression
∫ y1
0
∫ y2
0
. . .
∫ yt−1
0
[
t−1∏
k=1
σk(mk|θ1,m1, . . . , θk−1,mk−1, θk)
]
dθt−1 dθt−2 . . . dθ1.
is the probability of the event that θ1 ≤ y1, θ2 ≤ y2,. . . , θt−1 ≤ yt−1 and the messages sent are
m1,m2, . . . ,mt−1. We denote this probability by χt(σ,τ)(h
t
r)(y
1, y2, . . . , yt−1).
The quantity χt(σ,τ)(h
t
r)(1, 1, . . . , 1) is the probability that the history at period t is h
t
r. Thus, the
probability of the event that θ1 ≤ y1, θ2 ≤ y2, . . . , θt−1 ≤ yt−1 conditional on the messages
m1,m2, . . . ,mt−1 is
Ψt(σ,τ)(h
t
r)(y
1, y2, . . . , yt−1) =
χt(σ,τ)(h
t
r)(y
1, y2, . . . , yt−1)
χt(σ,τ)(h
t
r)(1, 1, . . . , 1)
.
If a certain history htr occurs with probability zero, that is, if χ
t
(σ,τ)(h
t
r)(1, 1, . . . , 1) = 0, then we define
Ψt(σ,τ)(h
t
r) to be any probability distribution. The choice of this probability distribution plays no role
in our proofs. The probabilities Ψt(σ,τ)(h
t
r)(y
1, y2, . . . , yt−1) induce the desired probability measure
Pσ,τ,ht
r
on the possible histories hts for the sender.
B. Expected payoff
In this appendix, we provide the details of how the expected payoffs Us(σ, τ), Ur(σ, τ) and the con-
tinuation expected payoffs U ts(σ, τ)(h
t
s) and U
t
r(σ, τ)(h
t
r) from period t onward can be calculated.
It is both convenient and standard to assume that even if the receiver quits at some period t, play
continues indefinitely, but actions in any period beyond t have no influence on the payoffs. With this
assumption, a play of the game is a sequence ω = (θt,mt, at)∞t=1 where θ
t ∈ I, mt ∈ M and at ∈ A.
Denote by Ω = (I ×M ×A)N the set of all plays. Given the usual Borel sigma-algebra of I, we endow
Ω with the product sigma-algebra B.
With abuse of notation, define θt : Ω→ I, mt : Ω→M and at : Ω→ A to be the projection maps from
the set of plays, respectively to the state, the message and the action at period t. Let S : Ω→ N∪{∞}
be the mapping such that, for each ω ∈ Ω, S(ω) is the first period t for which at(ω) = aq. If there
is no such t then S(ω) =∞. It is the stopping time which indicates when the game effectively ends.
For a play ω, the payoffs for the players are given as follows
Πs(ω) = f
S(ω)
(
θS(ω)(ω)
)
· 1{S(ω)<∞}, Πr(ω) = gS(ω)
(
θS(ω)(ω)
)
· 1{S(ω)<∞}.
Any fixed strategy profile (σ, τ) induces a probability measure on the measurable space (Ω,B), denoted
by Pσ,τ . The expectation with respect to this probability measure is denoted by Eσ,τ . The expected
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payoff for the sender is given by Us(σ, τ) = Eσ,τ
[
Πs(ω)
]
and the expected payoff for the receiver is
given by Ur(σ, τ) = Eσ,τ
[
Πr(ω)
]
.
Let Ω≥t denote the set of all continuation plays ω≥t = (θk,mk, ak)∞k=t. Given a history h
t
s ∈ H
t
s for
the sender, the continuation strategy σ[hts] = (σ
k[hts])
∞
k=1 of σ is defined in the usual way: for each
period k ∈ N, history h
k
s ∈ H
k
s and state θ
k ∈ I we let
σk[hts](h
k
s , θ
k) = σt+k−1(hts, h
k
s , θ
k).
Given a history htr ∈ H
t
r for the receiver, we define in a similar way the continuation strategy τ [h
t
r] =
(τk[htr])
∞
k=1 of τ .
For each period t, let πt : Hts → H
t
r be the map that projects the sender’s history to the receiver’s
history. For a given history hts of the sender, the continuation strategies σ[h
t
s] and τ [π(h
t
s)] induce a
probability measure on the space (Ω,B), denoted by Pσ,τ,ht
s
. The expected continuation payoff for the
sender is given by U ts(σ, τ)(h
t
s) = Eσ,τ,hts
[
Πs(ω)
]
.
As discussed in Appendix A, the receiver has a probability distribution (belief) Pσ,τ,ht
r
on the set Hts,
conditional on his history htr. The expected continuation payoff for the receiver is can be calculated
as follows
U tr(σ, τ)(h
t
r) =
∫
Ht
s
Ur(σ[h
t
s], τ [h
t
r ]) Pσ,τ,htr(dh
t
s).
Here, the integrand Ur(σ[h
t
s], τ [h
t
r ]) is the receiver’s expected payoff given the continuation strategies
σ[hts] and τ [h
t
r].
C. Extension: Arbitrary distribution
We consider an extension in which the states at each period are drawn from an arbitrary distribution
for the games with finite or infinite horizon and with payoffs that are discounted or period independent.
Consider a sender-receiver game where the payoffs are either discounted (δ < 1) or period independent
(δ = 1). Let the characteristic functions f and g from I to R+ be strictly increasing with f(0) =
g(0) = 0. At each period t, the state θt is drawn from a fixed cumulative distribution F on [0, 1],
independently from realized states of previous periods. We assume that F is strictly increasing and
continuous on [0, 1] and F (0) = 0. We denote this game by GF .
Using the game GF , we define a new game Gu with the same horizon T in which the states at each
period t in the game Gu are drawn from the uniform distribution independently from states of previous
periods. The game Gu has the same δ as the game GF and has the characteristic functions fˆ and gˆ
which are defined as follows: fˆ(x) = f(F−1(x)), gˆ(x) = g(F−1(x)).
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Given a strategy profile (σ, τ) in the game GF , consider a strategy profile (σˆ, τˆ ) in the game Gu,
defined as follows: σˆt(θt) = σt(F−1(θt)) and τˆ t(mt) = τ t(mt). It is straightforward, but tedious to
show that the payoffs of the players in the game Gu when the strategy profile is (σˆ, τˆ) and in the game
GF when the strategy profile is (σ, τ) are exactly same.
Under this transformation, the receiver’s strategy remains the same. If the sender’s strategy σ in
GF is a threshold strategy with a threshold αt at period t, then σˆ is also a threshold strategy with
threshold F−1(αt) at period t. So, the regular strategy profile in GF is transformed into the regular
strategy profile in Gu. Hence, the existence and unicity results in the game Gu can be used to derive
the existence and unicity results in the game GF .
D. Auxiliary lemmas
For the statement and proofs in the appendix, we fix the strictly increasing continuous functions f
and g from I to R+ such that f(0) = 0, g(0) = 0.
Consider an auxiliary function G : I → R is defined as G(x) = x · f(x) +
∫ 1
x
f(θ)dθ and recall the
function H : I → R defined as H(x) = f−1(δ ·G(x)).
Lemma 7. The following statements hold:
[1] The functions G,H are strictly increasing,
[2] The function H has a unique fixed point, denoted by β,
[3] H(y) > y for all y < β and H(y) < y for all y > β,
[4] β → 1 as δ → 1 and β = 1 when δ = 1.
Proof. [1] Take 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1. Because f(x) < f(y), we have
G(y)−G(x) = [yf(y) +
∫ 1
y
f(θ)dθ]− [xf(x) +
∫ 1
x
f(θ)dθ]
= yf(y)− xf(x)−
∫ y
x
f(θ)dθ
≥ (y − x)f(y)−
∫ y
x
f(θ)dθ > 0.
Hence, G is strictly increasing. The monotonicity of H follows easily.
[2] We have H(0) > 0 and H(1) ≤ 1. As H is strictly increasing, there exists x ∈ I such that
H(x) = x. Let β = inf{x ∈ I|H(x) = x}. By continuity of H , we have H(β) = β. Now we will prove
part 3 of the lemma. This will imply that β is the unique solution of H(x) = x.
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[3] We will show that the function k(x) = f(H(x))−f(x) is decreasing in x ∈ I. So, take 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1.
We have
k(y)− k(x) =
[
δ ·G(y)− f(y)
]
−
[
δ ·G(x) − f(x)
]
= δ ·
[
G(y)−G(x)
]
− f(y) + f(x)
= δ ·
[
yf(y)− xf(x) −
∫ y
x
f(θ)dθ
]
− f(y) + f(x)
= −(1− δy) · f(y) + (1 − δx) · f(x)− δ ·
∫ y
x
f(θ)dθ
≤ −(1− δy) · f(x) + (1− δx) · f(x)− δ ·
∫ y
x
f(θ)dθ
= δ ·
[
(y − x) · f(x)−
∫ y
x
f(θ)dθ
]
< 0.
So the function k(x) = f(H(x))− f(x) is indeed decreasing in x ∈ I.
Notice that k(β) = 0. Assume that y < β. Then, since k is decreasing, we have k(y) > k(β) = 0.
Hence, f(H(y)) > f(y), so H(y) > y. Similarly, if y > β then H(y) < y.
[4] As β is the unique fixed point of H , and for δ = 1 we have H(1) = 1, it follows that β = 1 when
δ = 1. A continuity argument shows that β → 1 as δ → 1. This completes the proof.
For the next lemma, let the game has the finite horizon T . Recall that βT = 0 and βt = H(βt+1) for
all t = 1, . . . , T − 1 and the function V is defined as V (x) = 1
x
·
∫ x
0 g(θ)dθ. Whenever necessary we
use the notation βt(T ) for the threshold at period t to specify the horizon T .
Lemma 8. The following statements hold:
[1] 1 ≥ β > β1 > β2 > · · · > βT = 0.
[2] 1
βt
·
∫ βt
0
gt(θ)dθ <
∫ 1
0
gt+1(θ)dθ for δ ∈ [DT , 1] and t = 1, . . . , T − 1
[3] β1(T )→ β as T →∞. More generally, βt(T )→ β as T →∞ for each t.
Proof. [1] By definition, βT = 0. We also have
βT−1 = H(βT ) = H(0) = f−1
(
δ ·
∫ 1
0
f(θ)dθ
)
> 0.
So, βT−1 > βT . Then inductively βt = H
(
βt+1
)
> H
(
βt+2
)
= βt+1 for all t = T − 2, . . . , 1. Thus,
β1 > β2 > · · · > βT = 0.
As β1 > β2, we have H(β1) > H(β2) = β1. So, by lemma 7.3, we have β1 < β.
Finally, β = H(β) ≤ f−1(δf(1)) < f−1(f(1)) = 1, so β < 1. This completes the proof.
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[2] It holds that
1
βt
·
∫ βt
0
gt(θ)dθ <
1
β1
·
∫ β1
0
gt(θ)dθ ≤ δ ·
∫ 1
0
gt(θ)dθ =
∫ 1
0
gt+1(θ)dθ.
The first inequality follows from from substituting a = b = 0, c = βt, and d = β1 into Lemma 10. The
second inequality follows from the fact that δ · V (1) ≥ V (β1), which is true due to the assumption
δ ∈ [DT , 1].
[3] By definition, we have βt(T ) = β1(T − t+1) for t ≤ T . So, it is sufficient to show that β1(T )→ β
as T →∞. By part [1], we have βt(T ) > βt+1(T ). So, we have β1(T − t+ 1) > β1(T − t) for t < T .
By replacing T − t+ 1 to T , we obtain β1(T ) > β1(T − 1) for any T > 1.
As H is strictly increasing, we have H
(
β1(T )
)
> H
(
β1(T −1)
)
= β1(T ). So, by lemma 7.3, β1(T ) < β
for all T ∈ N. Hence the sequence
(
β1(T )
)
T∈N is strictly increasing and bounded above by β. Assume
that the sequence converges to y ∈ [0, β]. We need to show that y = β. We now will assume that
y < β and show a contradiction, which will prove y = β. Denote z = min {H(x)− x : x ∈ [0, y]}. By
Lemma 7.3, H(x) > x for x ≤ y < β. By continuity of H , we have z > 0.
As the sequence
(
β1(T )
)
T∈N converges to y, for ǫ =
z
2 , there exists T
′ > 0 such that β1(T ) ∈ [y−ǫ, y] for
all T > T ′. Now for any fixed T > T ′, consider β1(T+1) = H
(
β1(T )
)
≥ β1(T )+z ≥ y−ǫ+z = y+ z2 .
This is a contradiction as T + 1 > T ′. This completes the proof.
Recall that the function f : I → R is Lipschitz at 1 if there exist a constant M > 0 and number
Y ∈ (0, 1) such that f(1)− f(y) ≤M · (1− y) for all y ∈ [Y, 1].
Lemma 9. The following statements hold:
[1] If f is Lipschitz at 1, then for every K > 0 there is E ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ∈ [E, 1],
1− β ≥ K · (1− δ).
[2] If f is Lipschitz at 1, then there is D ∈ [0, 1) such that for all δ ∈ [D, 1],
δ · V (1) ≥ V (β).
[3] 1
β
·
∫ β
0
gt(θ)dθ <
∫ 1
0
gt+1(θ)dθ for δ ∈ (D, 1).
Proof. [1] The proof of part 1 is in two parts.
A. Write k(δ) = 1− δ · β. We first show that
(1− δ) · f(1) ≤ [f(1)− f(β)] · k(δ). (2)
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Note that, by definition of β,
f(β) = δ ·G(β) = δ ·
[
β · f(β) +
∫ 1
β
f(θ)dθ
]
.
This yields
f(β) [1− δ · β] = δ ·
∫ 1
β
f(θ)dθ ≤ δ · (1− β) · f(1).
Expanding brackets and adding f(1) to both sides yields the inequality
f(1) + f(β)− δ · β · f(β) ≤ f(1) + δf(1)− δ · β · f(1).
This can be rewritten into
(1− δ) · f(1) ≤ [f(1)− f(β] · k(δ).
B. We continue with the proof of the statement. Since the function f : I → R is Lipschitz at 1,
there exist a constant M > 0 and number Y ∈ (0, 1) such that f(1) − f(y) ≤ M · (1 − y) for all
y ∈ [Y, 1].
Take K > 0. Define L = f(1)
K·M . As δ tends to 1, k(δ) = 1 − δ · β tends to 0. So, there is E ∈ [Y, 1)
such that k(δ) ≤ L for all δ ∈ [E, 1]. Take any δ ∈ [E, 1].
If δ = 1, then inequality (2) is trivially true. So suppose that δ ∈ [E, 1). Then, using the result from
A,
(1− δ) · f(1) ≤
f(1)− f(β)
1− β
· (1− β) · k(δ)
≤ M · (1− β) · k(δ)
≤ M · (1− β) · L
= (1− β) ·
f(1)
K
.
Since f(1) > 0, the part 1 of the lemma follows.
[2] Define
k(x) = g(x)−
1
x
∫ x
0
g(θ)dθ
for all x ∈ (0, 1]. Note that k is continuous and k(1) > 0. Hence, there are ε > 0 and C ∈ (0, 1) with
k(x) ≥ ε for all x ≥ C. Define K = V (1)
ε
. Take E ∈ (0, 1) as in Lemma 9.1. In view of Lemma 7.4,
there is F ∈ (0, 1) such that β ≥ C for all δ ∈ [F, 1]. Take D = max{E,F}. Take any δ ∈ [D, 1].
Then
V (1)− V (β) =
∫ 1
0
g(θ)dθ −
1
β
∫ β
0
g(θ)dθ
≥ (1− β) · g(β) +
∫ β
0
g(θ)dθ −
1
β
∫ β
0
g(θ)dθ
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= (1− β) ·
[
g(β)−
1
β
∫ β
0
g(θ)dθ
]
= (1− β) · k(β)
≥ (1− β) · ε
≥ K · (1− δ) · ε
= (1− δ) · V (1).
It follows that δ · V (1) ≥ V (β) for all δ ∈ [D, 1].
[3] It holds that
1
β
·
∫ β
0
gt(θ)dθ < δ ·
∫ 1
0
gt(θ)dθ =
∫ 1
0
gt+1(θ)dθ.
The first inequality follows the fact that δ · V (1) ≥ V (β), which is true due to the assumption
δ ∈ (D, 1).
Lemma 10. Let g : R→ R be a non-decreasing function. Then, for any a ≤ b < c ≤ d,
1
c− a
∫ c
a
g(x)dx ≤
1
d− b
∫ d
b
g(x)dx.
The inequality is strict if g is strictly increasing.
Proof. Define η : [a, c]→ [b, d] by
η(x) =
d− b
c− a
· x+
bc− ad
c− a
.
Then η(a) = b and η(c) = d, and η is a linear bijection between [a, c] and [b, d]. Because a ≤ b and
c ≤ d and η is linear, we have x ≤ η(x) for all x ∈ [a, c].
Write h(x) = (g ◦ η)(x) for all x ∈ [a, c]. Since x ≤ η(x) and g is non-decreasing, g ≤ h on [a, c]. By
using substitution, it follows that
1
c− a
∫ c
a
g(x) dx ≤
1
c− a
∫ c
a
h(x) dx
=
1
d− b
∫ c
a
(g ◦ η)(x) dη(x)
=
1
d− b
∫ d
b
g(y) dy.
This completes the proof.
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